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Abstract 
This paper considers how the WTO can make better use of the principle of “mutual 
supportiveness” as an interpretative tool. It examines the success of the WTO in 
enhancing the relationship between trade and environment and between the WTO 
agreements and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs); compares the different 
interpretative approaches in the United States – Shrimp and EC –Biotech; and argues 
that a mutually supportive approach that allows consideration of MEAs that are not 
binding on WTO parties does not change the rights and obligations of WTO members. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 7,200 words. 
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Introduction 
International trade and environmental law are two distinct but interrelated parts of the 
international legal system. Trade and environmental law intersect because increased 
production and trade can negatively affect the environment and measures to protect the 
environment can restrict trade.1 This tension could result in conflict between the World 
Trade Organization (WTO),2 the organisation at the heart of the multilateral trading 
system, and the institutions administering the 250 Multilateral Environment Agreements 
(MEAs) aimed at preserving and protecting the environment.3 The challenge for the 
WTO and environmental institutions is to develop international trade and environmental 
policies and law in a “mutually supportive” manner in order to protect the environment 
whilst upholding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. For the WTO, 
“mutual supportiveness” means ensuring that its laws and policies are consistent with its 
objective of sustainable development.4   
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider how the WTO can make better use of the 
principle of “mutual supportiveness” as an interpretative tool. The paper is divided into 
three parts. Part one considers the history of the trade-environment tension and the efforts 
of the WTO to understand and reconcile the relationship between the WTO and MEAs. 
Part two examines WTO panels’ jurisdiction to consider MEAs and compares the 
different approaches taken in the WTO cases United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (United States – Shrimp)5 and EC – Measures 
  
1 Kuijper, Pieter Jan Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts, The Case of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, Free Trade Agreements and the WTO (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, 2010, Geneva) at 15. 
2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is established under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 154 (opened for signature April 15 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995) [WTO Agreement]. The WTO was established during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and 
evolved out of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 UNTS 194 (opened for 
signature 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948). 
3 World Trade Organization “The Doha mandate on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)” 
˂www.wto.org˃.  
4 Sustainable development is an objective of the WTO as set out in the preamble to the WTO Agreement. 
5 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 
1998 (Report of the Appellate Body) [United States – Shrimp]. 
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Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC – Biotech).6 Part three 
argues that a mutually supportive approach that allows consideration of MEAs that are 
not binding on WTO parties does not change the rights and obligations of WTO 
members. The paper concludes that WTO dispute panels should be more explicit about 
the grounds for considering MEAs in order to mutually support trade and environment 
objectives. 
 
I Mutually supporting trade and environment policies 
A. Tension between trade and environment  
Trade-environment tensions arise in international law because the policies can conflict. 
MEA policies are directed at protecting and preserving the environment. MEAs can 
impose mandatory restrictions on trade to protect the environment (trade measures). For 
example, article III of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) prohibits trade in specified endangered species.7 MEAs 
can also expressly permit trade measures. For example, article II of the Kyoto Protocol 
sets out trade measures that member states may implement to reduce greenhouse gases.8 
Domestic states may also implement trade measures, not expressly required by a MEA, in 
pursuit of MEA objectives.9 
 
In contrast, WTO policies tend to be directed at liberalising trade and reducing trade 
barriers. The fundamental WTO principles are: non-discrimination (most-favoured-nation 
(MFN)10 and national treatment11), free trade through reduction of trade barriers12 and 
  
6 EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R, 29 Sept 2006 (Panel Report) [EC – Biotech]. 
7 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 993 UNTS 243 
(opened for signature 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) [CITES] article III. 
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 148 
(opened for signature 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) article II. 
9 For example, the United States Endangered Species Act of 1973 16 USC 35 § 1531, subject of the dispute 
in United States – Shrimp, above n 5, imposed a framework to regulate shrimp vessels in order to protect 
endangered species of turtles, in pursuant of a number of international agreements including CITES. 
10 For example, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle under article I of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1867 UNTS 187 (opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 
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fair competition.13 These provisions aim to reduce restrictive trade practices but can 
affect member states’ domestic environmental policies.  
 
The WTO agreements do allow member states to impose trade measures to achieve non-
trade objectives, including environmental objectives. However, the relevant provisions 
are designed to ensure that member states cannot use non-trade objectives as disguised 
barriers to trade. For example, article XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)14 allows measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health” and article XX(g) allows measures “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. However, the chapeau to article XX 
limits the circumstances in which members can impose trade measures. The measures 
must not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade”.15 Trade measures, even if taken pursuant to 
MEAs, must conform to the WTO trade principles.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
[GATT] requires states to treat imported products of all member states the same (i.e. treat every state as the 
“MFN”). 
11 For example, GATT, above n 10, article III which requires states to treat foreign products the same as 
like products produced domestically (i.e. give foreign goods “national treatment”). 
12 Such as tariffs, import bans, quotas on imports. For example, GATT, above n 10, article XI which 
prohibits bans or quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, other than customs and taxes. 
13 Fair competition includes non-discrimination as well as avoiding unfair practices such as dumping and 
subsidies. See for example: Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1869 UNTS 14 (opened 
for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). For a summary of the WTO principles see: 
WTO “Principles of the Trading System” ˂www.wto.org˃. 
14 GATT, above n 10. 
15 Other examples include: article 14 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 1869 UNTS 183 
(opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995); article 2 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 1867 UNTS 493 (opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995) [ SPS Agreement]; preamble to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade 1868 UNTS 120 (opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995); and article 
27 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (opened for signature 15 
April 1994, entered into force a January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement]. 
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B. Mutual supportiveness 
Mutual supportiveness is a tool to achieve common objectives of trade and 
environment.16 The concept arose out of the need to provide “coherence, balance and 
interaction between trade and environment”.17 Like the principle of systemic integration, 
mutual supportiveness is based on the notion that international law is a connected whole 
rather than a collection of self-contained regimes.18 Any one part of the international 
legal system is therefore affected or influenced by other developments within that 
system.19 Mutual supportiveness is about the relationship between the different parts of 
the legal system and their common objectives.20 
 
The concept’s first appearance in a major international environmental instrument was in 
Agenda 21,21 the action plan on sustainable development resulting from the 1992 the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (also 
known as the “Earth Summit”).22 Agenda 21 provides that governments should strive to 
“promote and support” policies that “make economic growth and environmental 
protection mutually supportive”23 and the international economy should support 
environment and development goals by “making trade and environment mutually 
  
16 Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane “A Footnote as a Principle: Mutual 
Supportiveness and its Relevance in an Era of Fragmentation” in Holger P. Hestermeyer and ors (ed), 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity - Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, (vol 2, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 2012) 1615 at 1625. 
17 Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane, above n 16, at 1618. 
18 Mutual supportiveness is similar to the concept of systemic integration which is a conflict avoidance 
technique that facilitates the coordination or harmonisation of international law. See for example: 
McLachlan, Campbell “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention” (2005) 54 ICLQ 279. But for differences see: Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse 
Mbengue, above n 16. 
19 Study Group of the International Law Commission Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law UN Doc, A/CN.4/L.702 (18 July 2006) adopted by the General Assembly: UN Doc 
A/Res/61/34 (4 December 2006) at 14. 
20 Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane, above n 16, at 1617. 
21 Agenda 21 (adopted at United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) 
A/CONDF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992).  
22 Pavoni, Riccardo “Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed 
for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?” (2010) 21 EJIL 649 at 651. 
23 Agenda 21, above n 21, at paragraph 2.9(d). See also paragraph 2.10(d). 
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supportive”.24 Since its debut in Agenda 21 it has occurred frequently throughout 
different international instruments relating to trade and environment.25 
 
At a law-making level, mutual supportiveness encompasses the need to ensure that trade 
and environmental policies and treaties not only co-exist in harmony but are also 
complimentary or mutually reinforcing.26 Mutual supportiveness requires member states 
to coordinate their international and domestic policies on trade and environment.27 As an 
interpretative tool, mutual supportiveness is similar to the principle of harmonisation or 
presumption against conflicts.28 However, mutual supportiveness is more than a 
presumption against conflicts.29  Mutual supportiveness is also more than taking account 
of relevant treaties as interpretative tool. Rather, mutual supportiveness is a “solution” to 
conflict30 or a “neutral and unbiased principle” to aid interpreters to find an “equitable 
  
24 Agenda 21, above n 21, at paragraph 2.3B. See also paragraphs 2.19 and 2.21(a). 
25 For example: WTO Decision on Trade and Environment (Adopted by Ministers at the Meeting of the 
Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee, Marrakesh, 1994) MTN/TNC/45(MIN) (15 April 1994) 
[Marrakesh Decision]; CTE Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade Environment to the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference WT/CTE/1 (Geneva, 12 November 1996) [CTE Report (1996)]; Doha WTO 
Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (14 November 2001) [Doha Declaration] at [6] and [31]; 
preamble to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 2226 UNTS 
208 (opened for signature 29 January 2000, entered into force 29 December 1993) [CPB]; preamble to the 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade 2244 UNTS 337 (opened for signature 11 September 1998, entered into force 24 
February 2004); preamble to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
2400 UNTS 303 (opened for signature 1 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 2004); preamble to the 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2256 UNTS 119 (opened for signature 23 May 2001, entered 
into force 17 May 2004); article 20 of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions 2440 UNTS 311 (opened for signature 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 
2007); preamble and article 4(3) of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(opened for signature 2 February 2011, not yet in force) available at ˂www.cbd.int˃. For an overview of 
the use of mutual supportiveness in international legal instruments see: Pavoni, Riccardo, above n 22; and 
Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane, above n 16. 
26 Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane, above n 16, at 1618.  
27 Ibid, at 1622. 
28 Kuijper, Pieter Jan, above n 1, at 7. 
29 Ibid; Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence and Moïse Mbengue, Makane, above n 16, at 1617. 
30 Kuijper, Pieter Jan, above n 1, at 14. 
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balance between the competing interests and values” of different regimes.31 In this way 
mutual supportiveness requires interpreters to look at trade and environment law in 
relation to the wider normative framework of public international law.32 Rather than 
merely avoid conflicts, the interpretation of the treaty should support the objectives of 
both treaties.33  
C. Mutual supportiveness as a law-making function within the WTO 
Since its establishment the WTO has recognised the impact of trade on the environment 
and vice versa. Whilst not specifically mentioning “mutual supportiveness”, the preamble 
to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement)34 does refer to 
sustainable development. The preamble provides that members recognise: 
that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of 
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different 
levels of economic development [emphasis added]. 
 
The preamble illustrates that members recognise that increased trade and lowering trade 
barriers are not the ultimate objectives; rather raising living standards alongside 
sustainable development and protection and preservation of the environment are the 
overarching objectives of the WTO.35  
1 The Committee on Trade and Environment 
In accordance with its objective of sustainable development, members signed the 
Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment 1994 (Marrakesh 
  
31 Pavoni, Riccardo, “above n 22, at 665. 
32 Ibid, at 665. 
33 Kuijper, Pieter Jan, above n 1, at 14-15. 
34 WTO Agreement, above n 2.  
35 World Trade Organization, “Trade and Environment” ˂www.wto.org˃. 
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Decision).36 The Marrakesh Decision expressly refers to the WTO Agreement preamble. 
It also states that the multilateral trading system and environmental protection should not 
be contradictory and expresses a desire to coordinate trade and environmental policies.37 
The Marrakesh Decision also established a specialist environmental committee – the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).38 The aim of the CTE is to make 
“international trade and environmental policies mutually supportive”.39 In particular the 
CTE is mandated to “identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental 
measures, in order to promote sustainable development” and “make appropriate 
recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions of the multilateral 
trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and non-discriminatory 
nature of the system”.40  
 
Although the CTE has not recommended any amendments to the WTO rules,41 it has 
devoted considerable time to researching the relationship between trade and 
environmental measures.42 The CTE’s work programme covers a wide range of activities 
including: holding information sessions with Secretariats of MEAs; sharing domestic 
experiences with trade measures; and updating a “Matrix on Trade-related Measures 
Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements” which identifies MEAs 
with trade measures43 and an environmental database containing information on domestic 
environment-related trade measures.44  
  
36 Marrakesh Decision, above n 25. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 World Trade Organization, “Items on the CTE’s Work Programme” ˂www.wto.org˃.  
42 For a list of the ten items see: World Trade Organization, “Items on the CTE’s Work Programme” 
˂www.wto.org˃. 
43 CTE and CTESS Matrix on Trade-Related Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.6; TN/TE/S/5/Rev.4 (4 October 2013). 
44 The most updated list is: CTE Environmental Database for 2011 WT/CTE/EDB/11 (21 August 2013). 
The database provides an overview of the domestic environment related measures notified under the WTO 
agreements and mentioned in trade policy reviews and environment related provisions in regional trade 
agreements. 
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2 The Doha Round 
At the fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001, members agreed to 
commence a new round of negotiations including, for the first time, negotiations on trade-
environment issues.45 Enhancing mutually supportive trade and environmental policies is 
one of the objectives of the Doha Round.46 The negotiating topics are: the relationship 
between the WTO rules and MEAs; collaboration between the WTO and MEA 
secretariats; and the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on environmental goods 
and services.47 In 2011 the Chairperson released a report48 on the status of the 
negotiations containing a draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment (draft 
Ministerial Decision).49 The draft Ministerial Decision affirms members’ commitment to 
sustainable development to enhance coherence and mutual supportiveness between the 
WTO and MEAs.50 The draft clarifies the term “specific trade obligations” (STO)51 and 
includes a number of commitments including encouraging the sharing of domestic 
experiences with STOs;52 collaborating with MEA secretariats through information 
exchange and granting MEA secretariats observer status in the CTE;53 providing 
technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries;54 establishing a group 
of experts on trade and environment to aid members’ implementation of MEA STOs;55 
  
45  Doha Declaration, above n 25, at [31]. The Doha Declaration also restates the continuing work agenda 
for the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) as set out in the Marrakesh Decision. In particular, 
the CTE was given mandate to focus on three items: the effect of environmental measures on market access 
and the win-win-win situations; the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; and labelling 
requirements for environmental purposes: Doha Declaration, at paragraph 32(i). 
46 Doha Declaration, above n 25, at [31]. 
47 Ibid. The negotiations take place in the CTE Special Sessions (CTESS). 
48 CTESS Report (2012) of the Committee on Trade and Environment TN/TE/20 (21 April 2011) [CTESS 
Report (2012)]. 
49 Preamble to the Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, in annex 1of the CTESS Report 
(2012), ibid, [Draft Ministerial Decision].  
50 Ibid. 
51 A Specific Trade Obligation (STO) set out in a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) requires a 
MEA party to take, or refrain from taking, a particular trade action: ibid. 
52 Ibid, at [1]. 
53 Ibid, at [2], [3] and [4]. 
54 Ibid, at [5](c). 
55 Ibid, at [5](d) and Proposed Elements Relating to a Group of Experts, in annex 1.A of the CTESS Report 
(2012), above n 48. 
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encouraging members to use MEA experts during consultation procedures under article 4 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU);56 and encouraging members to request panels to seek information from MEA 
experts during proceedings under article 13 of the DSU.57 
 
The work of the CTE and CTESS is crucial to achieving mutual supportiveness between 
WTO and environmental policies. In its first report the CTE endorsed multilateral 
solutions to environmental problems and emphasised the mutually supportive relationship 
of the WTO agreements and MEAs.58 The Doha Declaration expressly recognises that 
sovereign states should be allowed to impose measures to protect “human, animal or 
plant life or health” or the environment as long as the measures are consistent with the 
principles of the WTO agreements.59 The reference to sustainable development and 
environmental protection in these instruments illustrates that WTO members 
acknowledge the importance of balancing trade activities with environmental 
protection.60 However, it appears that most of the work is more an exercise to understand 
the trade-environment relationship. The slow progress of negotiations and the lack of any 
recommended amendments to the WTO agreements, may demonstrate the sensitivity of 
the area and the caution that WTO members are taking in order to avoid giving too much 
protection to the environment at the expense of free trade. The existence of the CTE and 
the draft Ministerial Decision at least offer hope that there is political will within the 
WTO to resolve some of the trade-environment issues consistent with sustainable 
development objectives.  
 
  
56 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1869 UNTS 401 (opened 
for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [Dispute Settlement Understanding]. Article 
4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding requires members to follow certain consultation procedures to 
resolve trade issues before panels can be established. 
57 Ibid, at [5](e) and Proposed Elements on Dispute Settlement, in annex 1.B of the CTESS Report (2012), 
above n 48. Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding authorises panels to seek information, 
technical advice and expert opinions from non-WTO sources. 
58 CTE Report (1996), above n 25, at [171]. 
59 Doha Declaration, above n 25, at [6]. 
60 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [129] and  [152]-153]. 
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II Mutual supportiveness as an interpretative technique  
A mutually supportive interpretation would require interpreters to consider the “object 
and purpose” of the WTO agreements in light of the wider normative context. This would 
include the development of the international community’s environmental concerns as 
demonstrated through the establishment of MEAs to protect and preserve the 
environment. 
 
The first three sections consider WTO panels’ jurisdiction and its ability to consider 
MEAs and explain why panels should consider MEAs. The fourth section briefly 
describes how panels may consider MEAs under article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).61 The fifth and sixth section compares the 
different approaches taken in two WTO cases.  
A. Jurisdiction of the WTO 
The DSU provides for the establishment of panels62 and sets out the rules for dispute 
settlement. Disputes brought to the WTO must relate to trade issues under WTO 
agreements. WTO panels do not have standing to hear non-WTO claims. Article 1 of the 
DSU provides that the rules and procedures of the DSU apply to disputes under the 
“covered agreements” listed in appendix 1 of the DSU. The covered agreements only 
include WTO agreements.  
 
The limited jurisdiction of panels is supported by articles 7 and 11. Article 7(1) provides 
that panels are to examine the disputed matter in light of the relevant provisions in the 
covered agreements. Article 7(2) provides that panels shall address the relevant 
provisions in the covered agreements. Further, articles 7(1) and 11 provide that panels are 
to make findings to assist the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to make recommendations 
or rulings provided for in the covered agreements. The specific reference to the covered 
agreements makes it clear that panels must assess whether the trade measures comply 
  
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 April 1980) [Vienna Convention]. 
62 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 56, article 6(1). 
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with the covered agreements and can only recommend that the DSB enforce the rules of 
the covered agreements.63 
B. Applicable law  
While panels do not have jurisdiction to apply and enforce non-WTO law, panels may 
consider non-WTO law to assist the interpretation of WTO agreements.64 Article 3.2 of 
the DSU expressly recognises that the WTO is not isolated from international law but is 
part of a wider set of institutions.65 Article 3.2 provides that the dispute settlement system 
aims to “… clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. Customary international 
law, part of which is codified in the Vienna Convention,66 requires consideration of other 
sources of international law, potentially including MEAs, when interpreting treaties.67 
 
Even without express reference in article 3.2 to customary rules of interpretation, panels 
would still be required to interpret WTO provisions in light of other international law. 
This is because the WTO agreements are part of international law.68 The WTO is not a 
closed system and cannot operate outside of existing customary international rules of 
law.69 Therefore, customary international law applies automatically and the DSU does not 
  
63 Marceau, Gabrielle “WTO Agreements Cannot Be Read in Clinical Isolation from Public International 
Law (AB Report in US – Gasoline)” in World Bank Seminar Legal Aspects of International Trade (The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, 2001) 215 at 218. 
64 Pauwelyn, Joost “How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and 
Merits” (2003) 37 JWTL 997 at 1000. 
65 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996 
(Report of the Appellate Body) [United States – Gasoline] at 17. 
66 Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention , above n 61 , are considered customary international 
law: United States – Gasoline, above n 65, at 23 and Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 Oct 1996 (Report of the Appellate Body) [Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages] at 104. 
67 Condon, Bradly J Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law 
(Transnational Publishers Inc, New York, 2006) at 33. See also: Pauwelyn, Joost “The Role of Public 
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?” (2001) 95 AJIL 535 at 542-543. The panel has 
accepted that customary international law applies to WTO agreements: Korea – Measures affecting 
Government Procurement WT/DS/163/R, 1 May 2000 (Report of Panel) [Korea – Government 
Procurement] at [7.96] and [7.101]. 
68 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 64, at 1001-1002. 
69 Korea –Government Procurement, above n 67, at [7.96]; Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 64, at 1002.  
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need to expressly state whether non-WTO law is applicable.70 Further, international law 
cannot be excluded unless WTO members expressly contract out of the international 
law.71 The DSU does not expressly contract out of non-WTO law.72 Therefore, unless 
WTO members expressly state that a particular MEA does not apply, panels can 
potentially consider it.  
 
Panels should also consider MEAs when interpreting WTO agreements as part of good 
treaty interpretation. Article 11 requires panels to make an “objective assessment of the 
matter”. Because there is likely to be little information regarding environmental issues in 
WTO agreements, interpreters would need to look beyond the WTO agreements in order 
to make an objective assessment.73 Further, the reference to sustainable development in 
the WTO Agreement preamble suggests that the WTO members intended that the 
covered agreements would be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with 
environmental international law and developments. Doing so will avoid the WTO 
becoming increasingly isolated and being inconsistent with international environmental 
law objectives.74 Panels that do not consider MEAs could be inconsistent with 
international rules on interpretation as well as the DSU.75  
 
C. Consideration of MEAs is good for the environment 
While it is important that the WTO negotiations mutually support trade and environment 
objectives, it is equally critical that panels take a mutually supportive approach to 
interpreting the WTO agreements.   
 
  
70 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 64, at 1002. 
71 Korea – Government Procurement, above n 67, at [7.96]: “…the relationship of the WTO Agreements to 
customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO members. Such 
international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not “contract out” from it…” 
72 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 64, at 1000. 
73 Marceau, Gabrielle, above n 63, at 216. 
74 Ibid, at 216-217; Marceau, Gabrielle “A Call for Coherence in International Law” (1999) 33 J W T 87 at 
109; United States – Gasoline, above n 65, at 21. 
75 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 67, at 562. 
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Consideration of MEAs is more likely to result in an environmentally friendly outcome 
compared with focusing only on WTO instruments. The WTO is not an environment 
forum and does not have competence in environmental issues.76 MEAs are likely to better 
inform panels of the contemporary environmental issues and indicate environmental 
concerns or values accepted by the international community.77 Proper weight may not be 
given to environmental issues if panels ignore MEAs in their interpretation of the WTO 
agreements. MEAs may also be more risk adverse and therefore have a lower threshold 
for imposing trade measures when faced with potential risks to the environment.78 
Therefore, mutual supportiveness is particularly important between trade and 
environment because trade can pose many unknown risks to the environment.79 
 
Not giving serious consideration to the relevance of MEAs also potentially undermines 
the status of the MEA.  This could send the signal to members that their WTO obligations 
trump environmental concerns. Further, it could create uncertainty for states considering 
whether implementing a trade measure pursuant to an MEA is inconsistent with their 
WTO trade obligations.  
 
WTO panels should also take heed of the work being undertaken within the CTE and take 
the progress as a signal that WTO members acknowledge the importance of achieving 
mutually supportive trade and environment outcomes. The fact that mutual 
supportiveness has made numerous appearances throughout WTO instruments 
strengthens the argument that panels should use it as a basis for interpreting WTO 
agreements.80 Failure to properly consider MEAs would not only be inconsistent with the 
work of the CTE but would completely undermine its efforts. There is little point of the 
CTE working with MEAs to reconcile the trade-environment relationship if panels are 
not willing to consider MEAs when interpreting the scope of those obligations. 
  
76 CTE Report 1996, above n 25, at [8]. 
77 In United States – Shrimp, above n 5, the Appellate Body referred to various MEAs as evidence of 
environmental concerns. See discussion below. 
78 For example the CPB, above n 25, affirms the precautionary principle in its preamble. 
79 Kuijper, Pieter Jan, above n 1, at 16. 
80 Pavoni, Riccardo, above n 22, at 652. 
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D. Consideration of MEAs under article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
When interpreting the WTO agreements panels must comply with customary 
international law on treaty interpretation.81 A starting point for panels is generally the 
interpretation rules in the Vienna Convention. The general rules on treaty interpretation 
are set out under article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Articles 31(1) and 31(3)(c) provide 
an avenue for panels to incorporate the principle of mutual supportiveness into treaty 
interpretation. Article 31(1) requires treaties to be interpreted:  
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.  
The requirement of “good faith” means that the interpretation must give effect to the 
treaty to avoid making the terms redundant.82 Article 31(3) requires, together with the 
context, the following matters to be taken into account: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
Unlike article 32, the rules under article 31 are not supplementary interpretation tools.83 
There is also no hierarchy or order in which the rules should be followed.84 This gives the 
interpreter the flexibility to use the rules relevant to the particular circumstances. 
 
  
81 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 56, article 3.2.  
82 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 66, at 13. See: Condon, Bradly J, above n 67, at 18-19. This is the 
principle of effectiveness 
83 Under article 32 the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion may be 
referred to if interpreting the terms in accordance with article 31 would result in a meaning that is 
ambiguous or obscure or manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
84 Study Group of the International Law Commission, above n 19, at [428]. 
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Both articles can aid panels to interpret the WTO agreement mutually supportive of trade 
and environment objectives. Under article 31(1) panels may find MEAs useful when 
determining the meaning of terms in WTO agreements in light of the object and purpose 
of the WTO Agreement. In applying a mutually supportive approach panels would 
interpret the WTO terms consistent with international environmental law in order to give 
effect to the objective of sustainable development.85 Under article 31(3)(c) MEAs could 
provide contextual background as relevant rules of international law.  
 
A good illustration of the different approaches to article 31(1) and 31(3)(c) can be seen in 
the decisions of the Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp and the panel in EC – 
Biotech. The Appellate Body’s approach is arguably the better approach as it is consistent 
with the principle of mutual supportiveness. In EC – Biotech the panel interpreted both 
articles narrowly, making them inadequate to support the principle of mutual 
supportiveness. 
1 United States – Shrimp 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand took an action against the United States’ 
restrictions on the import of shrimp and shrimp products, under section 609 of the Public 
Law 101-102, designed to protect turtles from environmentally unfriendly fishing 
techniques. In order to determine whether the trade measure was justified, the Appellate 
Body had to first determine whether turtles fell within the meaning of “exhaustible 
natural resources” under GATT article XX(g).  
 
The Appellate Body’s decision is consistent with the principle of mutual supportiveness 
because it expressly acknowledged the wider social and environmental context that 
international trade operates in. Firstly, the Appellate Body took note that in “modern 
biological sciences” living species can be exhaustible.86 Secondly, the Appellate Body 
held that the treaty must be read “in light of contemporary concerns of the community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment”.87 The Appellate Body 
  
85 This is the approach taken in United States – Shrimp, above n 5, discussed below. 
86 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [128]. 
87 Ibid, at [129]. 
18  
 
looked to the WTO Agreement preamble as evidence that members were aware of the 
importance of environmental protection.88 From this perspective the Appellate Body held 
that the term “natural resources” is generic and therefore capable of evolving.89 Thus, the 
Appellate Body found it necessary to refer to other “modern” international instruments 
that referred to “living natural resources”.90  
 
The Appellate Body gave due consideration to international environmental law, citing 
several MEAs to support its finding that the international community acknowledge the 
importance of protecting living natural resources. The Appellate Body referred to a 
number of instruments including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,91 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),92 Agenda 21,93 and the Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.94 This, together with the WTO 
Agreement preamble indicated that the definition of “natural resources” could include 
turtles.95 The Appellate Body then relied on the fact that the turtle species were listed as 
endangered in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES)96 as evidence that the turtles were “exhaustible”.97 The United 
States had not implemented trade measures pursuant to an MEA, yet the Appellate Body 
still found it important to consider international environmental law because the trade 
measures were in place in order to protect the environment. 
 
  
88 Ibid, at [129]. 
89 Ibid, at [130]. 
90 Ibid at [129]. 
91 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994). 
92 Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature on 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993) [CBD]. 
93 Agenda 21, above n 25.  
94 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [130]-[131]. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species 
of Wild Animals 1651 UNTS 333 (opened for signature 23 June 1979, entered into force 1 November 
1983) [CMSWA]. 
95 Ibid, at [131]. 
96 CITES, above n 7. 
97 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [132].  
19  
 
In considering whether the trade measure was consistent with the chapeau to article XX, 
the Appellate Body again referred to the WTO Agreement preamble noting the objective 
of sustainable development.98 The Appellate Body also noted that the preamble had been 
amended from seeking to achieve “full use” to “optimal use” of the world’s resources.99 
This was evidence that members understood that exploitation of resources should be 
consistent with sustainable development.100 The Appellate Body noted that the 
preambular language reflects the negotiators’ intentions and “must add colour, texture 
and shading” to the interpretation of the WTO agreements.101 The Appellate Body 
ultimately found that the trade measures were unjustifiable discrimination because the 
United States was effectively trying to impose its own domestic measures on other 
member states and had not properly engaged in negotiating an agreement to protect 
turtles.102 It based its conclusion on the fact that several international instruments state 
that unilateral actions to address environmental issues should be avoided in favour of 
international consensus.103  
 
It is unclear what interpretative rule the Appellate Body’s consideration of the MEAs was 
based on. It is suggested that the Appellate Body’s approach could fit within several 
different rules under article 31.104 The Appellate Body did not mention the Vienna 
  
98 Ibid, at [152].  
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid, at [152]-153]. 
101 Ibid, at [155]. 
102 Ibid, at [161]-[172]. 
103 Ibid, at [168]. The Appellate Body noted at [154] that the Marrakesh Decision refers to principle 12 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted at United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development) A/CONF.151/26 (Vol 1) (1992), Agenda 21, the CBD, the CMSWA and 
the CTE Report 1996 all advocate concerted action rather than unilateral actions to address environmental 
issues.  
104 Young, Margaret A “The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the 
Biotech Case” (2007) 56 ICLQ 907 at 920. Young suggests that the Appellate Body may have used article 
31(1) based on the ordinary meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” and the object and purpose of the 
WTO Agreement; article 31(2) based on reference to the WTO Agreement as context; 31(3)(b) based on 
subsequent practice as seen in the international instruments; and article 32 based on reference to 
contemporary concerns about the environment. 
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Convention in its interpretation of article XX(g).105 For example, the Appellate Body did 
not explain whether it based its findings on CITES because the disputing parties were all 
CITES members or simply because CITES has broad membership and therefore 
represents international consensus on the standard of “exhaustibility”.106 This omission 
left open the question of whether panels may consider MEAs under article 31(3)(c) if not 
all the disputing parties are MEA members. However, it is not mandatory for the panel to 
identify rules of interpretation. As noted above, interpreters should consider other 
international law as good interpretative practice. This is incorporated in the whole of 
article 31. What is important is that the Appellate Body used the MEAs and the other 
international environmental instruments because they were evidence of international 
consensus on the need to protect living resources through multilateral action. As will 
become clear below, this approach is more likely to provide a mutually supportive 
outcome for trade and environment because the Appellate Body did not constrain itself to 
a narrow interpretation of the Vienna Convention and avoid considering MEAs.  
2 EC – Biotech  
EC-Biotech involved a dispute between Canada, the United States, Argentina and the EC 
regarding the EC’s import policies on genetically modified products. The panel had to 
consider, among other issues, the relevance of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(CPB),107 CBD and other international instruments in aiding the interpretation of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement).108 The panel embarked on a rigid application of the Vienna Convention, 
  
105 The Appellate Body did refer to article 31(3)(c) in a footnote regarding the interpretation of the chapeau 
to article XX: “our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional interpretative 
guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international law.”: United States – Shrimp, above 
n 5, at [158] footnote 157. 
106 Horne, Henrik and Mavriodis, Petros C “MEAs in the WTO: Silence Speaks Volumes” (2011) 
˂www.econ-law.se˃ at 15. 
107 CPB, above n 25. 
108 SPS Agreement, above n 15. The panel also considered the applicability of the precautionary principle 
as a general principle of international law. However, the panel declined to express a view as to whether the 
principle was a general principle of international law: at [7.86]-[7.89]. 
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distinguishing between international law relevant under article 31(3)(c) and non-binding 
international law that can be used to interpret the ordinary meaning under article 31(1).109  
 
In respect of article 31(3)(c) the panel considered that “relevant rules of international 
law” included treaties, customary international law and, based on the finding in United 
States – Shrimp,110 general principles of international law.111 The panel recognised that 
the CPB could be relevant international law.112 However, the panel interpreted “the 
parties” under 31(3)(c) to refer to all parties to the treaty.113 Therefore, in order to be 
relevant all WTO members must be signatories to the international agreement. This 
means that the rules that can be considered under article 31(3)(c) would be limited to 
those rules that are equally applicable to all WTO members, thus supporting a consistent 
approach regarding the rights and obligations of all members.114  
 
Canada and Argentina had signed but not ratified the CPB and the United States was not 
a member, although the United States had participated in some aspects of negotiating.115 
Therefore, the panel held that the CPB was not a relevant rule of international law 
“applicable in the relations between the parties”.116 Further, the United States had not 
ratified the CBD and therefore it was only binding on the EC, Canada and Argentina and 
was not relevant to all the WTO members.117 The panel declined to consider whether the 
MEAs would be relevant rules of international law even if all of the disputing parties 
were parties to the MEAs and there was consensus between the disputing parties that the 
WTO law should be interpreted in light of the MEAs.118 Thus, the panel left open the 
issue of whether the CPB would be taken into account if all the parties to the dispute were 
CPB members. 
  
109 Young, Margaret A, above n 104, at 908-909. 
110 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [158] and footnote 157. 
111 EC – Biotech, above n 6, at [7.67]. 
112 Ibid, at [7.67]. 
113 Ibid, at [7.68]. 
114 Ibid, at [7.70]. 
115 Ibid, at [7.75]. 
116 Ibid, at [7.75]. 
117 Ibid, at [7.75]. 
118 Ibid, at [7.72]. 
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The panel then considered whether MEAs which are not binding on all the disputing 
parties can be used to interpret WTO rules as the Appellate Body had done in United 
States – Shrimp.119 The panel considered that non-binding instruments could be 
considered under article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.120 The panel found that in 
United States – Shrimp the Appellate Body had used the international instruments as 
interpretative aids under article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.121 Thus, instead of 
considering whether MEAs are relevant rules of international law under article 31(3)(c), 
the panel could use the MEAs as dictionaries under article 31(1).122 However, the panel 
did not use the CBD or the CPB to interpret the SPS Agreement. The panel stated that it 
had “carefully considered the provisions” but found it unnecessary and inappropriate to 
rely on the CBD and CPB provisions to aid the interpretation of the SPS Agreement.123 
The panel did not elaborate on its reasons for its decision. MEAs therefore were not used 
by the panel as interpretative tools.  
 
The panel did decide to use several different international standards, expressly referred to 
in the SPS Agreement, to aid its interpretation.124 The use of the other international 
instruments demonstrates that the panel was willing to interpret the SPS Agreement in 
light of relevant accepted practices in the international community. However, the panel 
qualified this by stating that if an interpreter did not find the non-WTO law informative, 
the interpreter need not rely on it.125 Therefore, the panel was able to select definitions 
from the various international standards, as well as the use of dictionaries, to interpret of 
the SPS Agreement. The panel has been criticised for its selective choice of which 
definitions to use.126 
  
119 Ibid, at [7.72]. 
120 Ibid, at [7.92]. 
121 Ibid, at [7.94]. 
122 Ibid, at [7.92]. 
123 Ibid, at [7.95]. 
124 Ibid, at [7.96]. 
125 Ibid, at [7.92]. 
126 For a comprehensive critique of the panel’s approach see: Young, Margaret A, above n 104. 
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3 How the panel’s decision affects MEAs in treaty interpretation 
The panel’s approach is inconsistent with the principle of mutual supportiveness for two 
reasons. Firstly, the panel significantly limits the types of international laws that could be 
relevant under article 31(3)(c). Because it is unlikely that an MEA will have identical 
membership to the WTO Agreement, the panel’s interpretation would mean that MEAs 
would rarely be taken into account.127 This view would therefore “isolate” the WTO as 
few agreements, if any, would be applicable.128 The alternative view is that not all WTO 
members need to be a member of an MEA in order for the MEA to be applicable. This 
view is supported by the fact that the term “parties” in other parts of article 31 is qualified 
by phrases such as “all the parties”,129 “one or more parties” and “other parties”.130 
Therefore “parties” alone may not amount to all WTO members.131 MEAs with different 
membership to the WTO Agreement could still be applicable if proven that they were 
widely accepted. Both the CBD and the CPB had large membership, arguably fairly 
reflecting the principles and standards accepted by the international community.132 
Further, the fact that the United States had signed the CBD suggests its acceptance of the 
CBD principles. The panel’s failure to properly consider the two MEAs could give the 
impression to the international community that an MEA, focusing on a specific field of 
environmental protection, with broad membership is irrelevant within the WTO.133  
 
Secondly, the panel reduces the consideration of MEAs under article 31(1) to use as 
dictionaries. Under the panel’s interpretation non-binding MEAs can only play a narrow 
interpretation role as dictionaries even if the subject matter of the MEA is directly 
  
127 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie, (Center for International Environmental Law) “Interpreting WTO 
Law and the Relevance of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in EC-Biotech” (paper presented to the 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law and the Institute of International Economic Law’s 
Seventh Annual WTO Conference, London, May 2007) at 4-5; Marceau, Gabrielle , above n 74, at 124. 
128 Marceau, Gabrielle, above n 74, at 124. 
129 Vienna Convention, above n 61, article 31(2)(a). 
130 Vienna Convention, above n 61, article 31(2)(b). 
131 Marceau, Gabrielle, above  n 74, at 125. 
132 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie, above n 127, at 5. As of 22 May 2007, the CBD counted 190 parties, 
and the Biosafety Protocol had 141 parties. 
133 Kulovesi, Kati The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Challenges of the Environment, Legitimacy and 
Fragmentation (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2011) at 178. 
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relevant to the disputed matter and the WTO provisions. This is inconsistent with the 
principle of mutual supportiveness as it undermines the status of MEAs as authorities on 
international environmental law.134 The panel’s approach is also inconsistent with the 
Appellate Body’s approach in United States – Shrimp. The Appellate Body did not use 
the MEAs as dictionaries but rather used them to show evidence of international 
acceptance of the specific terms. In critiquing the panel’s approach, the International Law 
Commission considered “taking ‘other treaties’ into account as evidence of ‘ordinary 
meaning’ appears a rather contrived way of preventing the ‘clinical isolation’ as 
emphasized by the Appellate Body”.135 The principle of mutual supportiveness is not the 
use of MEAs under article 31(1) as interpretative aids. Rather, mutual supportiveness 
requires the WTO law to be interpreted within its normative context – that is the wider 
international framework. MEAs paint a fuller picture of where the international 
community’s values and concerns lie and an interpretation of WTO agreements should be 
informed by this. The panel’s narrow reading of the article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
undermines its very purpose of facilitating coherence between treaties.  
 
If the panel had taken a mutual supportive approach, it could have considered the CBD 
and the CPB.136 The panel could have considered the MEAs under article 31(1) to help 
inform the object and purpose of the WTO agreements.137 After clarifying the 
relationship between the WTO agreements and the MEAs, the panel could have then 
decided that the MEAs were not particularly helpful in shedding light on the specific 
terms within the WTO agreements.138 However, even if the MEAs did not aid the 
interpretation of specific terms, the MEAs could have been helpful in shedding light on 
the internationally accepted standards regarding the treatment of genetically modified 
products.139 Such an approach would have gone some way towards reconciling the WTO 
  
134 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie, above n 127, at 5. 
135 Study Group of the International Law Commission, above n 19, at 228. 
136 Young, Margaret A, above n 104, at 927. 
137 Young, Margaret A, above n 104, at 921. 
138 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie, above n 127, at 12. 
139 Pavoni, Riccardo, above n 22, at 666.  
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agreements and MEAs. By failing to do so the panel missed an opportunity to mutually 
reinforce trade and environment law. 
 
III Does a mutually supportive interpretation alter WTO members’ rights 
and obligations? 
The panel’s reluctance to consider the CBD and the CPB appears to be based on the 
principle codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention that a treaty is only binding on 
those who have agreed to be bound.140 This is the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt.141 The panel expressed:142  
“But even independently of our own interpretation, we think Article 31(3)(c) cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as the European Communities suggests. Indeed, it is not 
apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty 
interpretation which could have as a consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to 
which that State is a party is affected by other rules of international law which that 
State has decided not to accept.” 
The panel may also have been referring to articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU which provide 
that the recommendations and findings of panels and the Appellate Body and the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB “cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements”. These articles make it clear that the 
DSB cannot import right or obligations into WTO agreements. Therefore, the panel’s 
understanding of treaty interpretation could mean that a mutually supportive approach 
under 31(3)(c) could allow MEAs to alter the rights and obligations of WTO members 
are not party to the MEA.143  
 
The first section of this part explains that the panel’s concerns are unfounded because a 
mutually supportive interpretation of the WTO agreements (and reference to MEAs that 
are not binding on all WTO members) would not alter the rights and obligations of WTO 
  
140 Marceau, Gabrielle, above n 74, at 127. 
141 Pauwelyn, Joost Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules 
of International Law (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2003) at 257. 
142 EC – Biotech, above n 6, at [7.71]. 
143 Pavoni, Riccardo, above n 22, at 665. 
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members. The second section explains how mutually supportive approach is based on the 
widely accepted evolutive approach to treaty interpretation. The third section then 
suggests when panels should consider non-binding MEAs under articles 31(3)(c) and 
31(1).  
A. Consideration does not amount to enforcement 
The panel in EC – Biotech seems to have mistaken consideration of the non-binding 
MEAs as amounting to enforcement of those MEAs or, at the very least, changing the 
scope of the WTO obligations. However, article 31(3)(c) only requires MEAs to be taken 
into account.144 This is quite different to importing MEA obligations into the WTO 
agreements or stretching the interpretation of the WTO provision beyond its ordinary 
meaning in order to be consistent with the MEAs. Such an interpretation would be 
inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness because it could reduce the provision to 
“inullity”.145 Therefore, taking MEAs into account cannot change the meanings of 
provisions; but is more limited to supporting the panel’s interpretation of the ordinary 
meaning.146  
 
Further, following the panel’s reasoning, other non-binding treaties could not have any 
influence on the interpretation of WTO agreements, otherwise they would alter the WTO 
obligations. In effect, the WTO agreements would exist in a vacuum, unaffected by 
developments in international law. Surely, this is an unsustainable view; given that the 
WTO is itself part of international law and the DSU expressly mentions use of customary 
international law to interpret the WTO agreements.147 As discussed in part two, because 
the WTO is part of the international legal system, it must be affected by all other 
developments within that system. Therefore, considering non-binding MEAs does not 
  
144 Marceau, Gabrielle, above n 74, at 126. 
145 Condon, Bradly J, above n 67 at 18-19. 
146 Hagiwara, Kazuki “The Principle of Integration in Sustainable Development Through the Process of 
Treaty Interpretation: Addressing the Balance Between Consensual Constraints and Incorporation of 
Normative Environment” (LLM Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2013) available at University of Ottawa 
Research ˂www.ruor.uottawa.ca˃ at 109. This is the approach that the Appellate Body took in United 
States – Shrimp when it referred to international environmental instruments to support its interpretation of 
“natural resources” to include living resources: at [130]-[131]. 
147 Study Group of the International Law Commission, above n 19, at [447]. 
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amount to changing the WTO obligations, but could merely reflect the evolution of the 
WTO agreements alongside the evolution of the international community’s values or 
norms. The Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission explains:148  
 “Interpretation does not “add” anything to the instrument that is being interpreted. It 
constructs the meaning of the instrument by a legal technique (a technique 
specifically approved by the DSU) that involves taking account of its normative 
environment … Interpretation does not add or diminish rights or obligations that 
would exist in some lawyers’ heaven where they could be ascertained 
“automatically” and independently of interpretation. All instruments receive 
meaning through interpretation – even the conclusion that a meaning is “ordinary” is 
an effect of interpretation that cannot have a priori precedence over other 
interpretations.” 
An objective interpretation of the WTO agreements must consider the normative context 
and therefore will always be influenced by considerations external to the WTO 
agreements, including scientific evidence on environmental issues and MEAs aimed at 
addressing those issues. 
B. The evolutive approach 
A mutually supportive approach is consistent with the well-established evolutive 
approach. The evolutive approach allows the interpreter to move away from an inter-
temporal interpretation, regarding the parties’ intentions at the time of the conclusion of 
the treaty, and look at the treaty provisions in light of its current context.149 An evolutive 
approach may be taken when it is clear that the parties intended such an interpretation. 
This will be the case when, for example, the treaty contains a term which is generic and 
evolving, the treaty’s object and purpose is “progressive”, or the specific obligations are 
general and therefore subject to changing circumstances.150 
 
In international jurisprudence there is a clear link between the evolutive approach and 
mutual supportiveness. In the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
  
148 Ibid. 
149 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 141, at 266-267.  
150 McLachlan, Campbell, above n 18, at 317-318. 
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(Hungary v Slovakia)151 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) invoked the evolutive 
approach, interpreting a 1977 treaty on a joint hydroelectric power project, in light of new 
environmental norms and standards in order to “reconcile economic development with 
protection of the environment”.152 The ICJ stated that the disputing parties should find a 
solution that takes account of the treaty objectives alongside the “norms of international 
environmental law and the principles of the law of international watercourses”.153 In the 
Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration154 the Arbitral Tribunal preferred the evolutive approach 
over the inter-temporal rule155 and considered that Belgium’s economic interests had to 
be reconciled with the Netherland’s environmental concerns, taking into account new 
environmental norms.156 The Arbitral Tribunal also stated that economic development 
law and environmental law are “mutually reinforcing”.157 In United States – Shrimp the 
Appellate Body used the evolutive approach when it determined that the generic term 
“natural resources” is “by definition evolutionary”;158 when it considered the objective of 
sustainable development demonstrated international acknowledgement of environmental 
concerns;159 and when it determined that turtles are exhaustible.160 These cases all refer to 
the need to balance economic development with environmental concerns and invoke the 
evolutive approach to interpret old treaties in light of new international environmental 
norms. A mutually supportive interpretation of generic terms or obligations and 
“progressive” objectives in light of MEAs that reflect contemporary environmental 
values is no different to the evolutive approaches in these cases.  
  
151 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7 [Hungary 
v Slovakia].  
152 Ibid, at [140]. 
153 Ibid, at [141]. 
154 Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration (Belgium v The Netherlands), 27 UNRIAA 127 (Decision of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, 24 May 2005) [Belgium v The Netherlands]. 
155 Ibid, at [81]. 
156 Ibid, at [221]-[223]. 
157 Ibid, at [59]. 
158 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [130] and footnote 109: The Appellate Body supported its 
approach by reference to: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] 
ICJ Rep 16 at 31:  
159 Ibid, at [129] and [152]. 
160 Ibid, at [132]. 
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Arguing against the evolutive approach, the terms of WTO agreements are specific to the 
WTO and still need to be interpreted in light of the context of the WTO agreements under 
article 31(1).161 Although other international law may shed light on the meaning of 
generic terms, context plays an important part role in influencing the term’s meaning.162 
The use of the same words in different treaties may have entirely different meanings 
depending on their negotiating history and context and the object and purpose of each 
treaty.163 MEAs are drafted within an entirely different setting and the objectives are 
quite different from trade objectives. Determining the meaning of a term in a WTO 
agreement by reference to an MEA could therefore replace the intentions of the WTO 
members with the intentions of the MEAs members.164  
 
However, the fact that the WTO’s objective is sustainable development may indicate that 
the parties intended that the interpretation of WTO agreements would be influenced by 
international environmental law because the WTO agreements themselves do not contain 
provisions on the environment. This is consistent with the Appellate Body’s finding in 
United States – Shrimp that the preamble adds “colour, texture and sharing” to the 
provisions.165 Further, the WTO members would have made it clear if the WTO 
provisions were not intended to be interpreted in light of other international law. The 
WTO agreements could provide definitions or be more prescriptive regarding the scope 
and applicability of the rights and obligations. The use of generic language, without 
further qualifications, is evidence that this was not the case.  
C. When should MEAs be considered under articles 31(1) and 31(3)(c)  
If consideration of MEAs does not alter the rights and obligations of WTO members, 
there should be no reason for panels to resist a mutually supportive approach. Panels 
should always consider MEAs when the subject matter of the MEA is directly relevant to 
  
161 Hagiwara, Kazuki, above n 146, at 101. 
162 Ibid. 
163 McLachlan, Campbell, above n 18, at 300. 
164 Hagiwara, Kazuki, above n 146, at 105. 
165 United States – Shrimp, above n 5, at [153] and [155]. 
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the WTO obligation and the issue in dispute. In order to promote the principle of mutual 
supportiveness in treaty interpretation, panels should also be more explicit about the legal 
basis for considering MEAs. This final section suggests the basis under articles 31(1) and 
31(3)(c).  
1 Article 31(1) 
MEAs should always be considered under article 31(1) when determining the meaning of 
WTO provisions in light of the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement. Because the 
objective is sustainable development, the WTO agreements should be more 
accommodating to the incorporation of the objectives of MEAs. Specific terms in MEA 
could also be considered if the terms reflected the common understanding of the WTO 
members. Thus, although not all WTO members had explicitly consented to such a 
meaning, its general usage in international law could be seen as acceptance or tolerance 
by those members.166  
2 Article 31(3)(c 
To meet the threshold for consideration under article 31(3)(c) the rule must be applicable 
between the parties. While not all MEAs would be applicable, some MEAs may be 
applicable if proven that the MEA reflects the common intentions of WTO members. 
Article 31(3)(c) sits within the context of 31(3)(a) and (b), relating to subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice, both of which require evidence of consensus.167 
MEAs that are only applicable between a small subsection of WTO members may not be 
“applicable between the parties” because it would be difficult to establish that the MEA 
rules reflect WTO members’ common intentions.168 However, an MEA could still reflect 
the common intentions even if the MEA was not binding on all the WTO members.169 
MEAs with wider membership can more easily demonstrate international acceptance of 
environmental norms or environmental issues.  
 
 
  
166 Pauwelyn, Joost, above n 141, at 257-63. 
167 Ibid, at 258. 
168 Ibid, at 257.  
169 Ibid, at 260. 
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IV Conclusion 
Mutual supportiveness can enhance the relationship between trade and environment. The 
CTE is slowly but proactively taking measures to reconcile trade and environmental 
policies and strengthen the relationship between the WTO and MEAs. The recurring 
reference to mutual supportiveness throughout different WTO instruments may lend 
weight to the argument that it is becoming a relevant principle within international law.170 
However, this is yet to be consistently reflected in the approach of the panel and 
Appellate Body’s interpretation of the law. The Appellate Body’s approach in United 
States – Shrimp is consistent with mutually supportiveness. However, this progress could 
be undone by the panel’s restrictive interpretation of articles 31(1) and 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention. The panel’s failure to adopt the mutually supportive approach 
potentially undermines the work of the CTE and the WTO’s objective of sustainable 
development.  
 
If a trade-environment dispute comes before the DSB, the panel should take the 
opportunity to clarify the relationship of the WTO agreements and MEAs. The panel 
should uphold the principle of mutual supportiveness by expressly stating that WTO 
provisions must be interpreted in light of their normative context which includes MEAs. 
The panel should also make it clear that MEAs do not need to be binding on all WTO 
members in order to be taken into account. Such an approach does not change the rights 
and obligations of WTO members. A mutual supportive interpretation, consistent with the 
objectives of MEAs will go some way towards reconciling trade and environmental 
policies. 
 
 
 
  
170 Pavoni, Riccardo, above n 22, at 652. 
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